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Abstract. We propose a hybrid model of differential privacy that considers a combination
of regular and opt-in users who desire the differential privacy guarantees of the local privacy
model and the trusted curator model, respectively. We demonstrate that within this
model, it is possible to design a new type of blended algorithm that improves the utility of
obtained data, while providing users with their desired privacy guarantees. We apply this
algorithm to the task of privately computing the head of the search log and show that the
blended approach provides significant improvements in the utility of the data compared to
related work. Specifically, on two large search click data sets, comprising 1.75 and 16 GB,
respectively, our approach attains NDCG values exceeding 95% across a range of privacy
budget values.
1. Introduction
Now more than ever we are confronted with the tension between collecting mass-scale user
data and the ability to release or share this data in a way that preserves the privacy of
individual users. Today, an organization that needs user data to improve the quality of
service they provide (through, for example, personalization) is often forced to perform data
collection themselves. As a result, only the biggest organizations can afford to do so, and
smaller ones get edged out because of the inability to compete effectively. Some of the
philosophy behind our work stems from a desire to enable privacy-preserving decentralized
data collection that aggregates data from multiple entities into high quality datasets.
Local differential privacy: Over the last several years, we have seen some examples of the
local differential privacy (LDP) model beginning to be used for data collection in practice,
most notably in the context of the Chrome web browser [15] and Apple’s data collection [18].
The preliminary version of this work appeared at the 26th USENIX Security Symposium in 2017 [6].
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In the LDP model, the data collector such as Google or Apple obtains aggregate data
statistics without observing the exact values of user’s private data. This is achieved by
applying a privacy-preserving perturbation to each user’s private data before it leaves the
user’s device. This approach protects not only the individual users, but also the data collector
from the possible privacy breaches.
Trusted curator model: An alternative model that has been most commonly used in the
academic literature is the trusted curator model, where a curator first collects each user’s
private data and then produces and releases a privacy-preserving version of the collected
data set. In this model, although users are guaranteed that the released data set protect
their privacy, they must be willing to share their private, unperturbed data with the curator
and trust that the curator properly performs a privacy-preserving perturbation.
Hybrid model: Much of the contribution in this paper stems from our observation that
the two models can co-exist. As others have observed [3, 2, 11], people’s attitudes toward
privacy vary widely. Specifically, some users may be comfortable with sharing their data
with a trusted curator.
Many companies rely on a group of beta testers with whom they have higher levels
of mutual trust. It is not uncommon for such beta testers to voluntarily opt-in to a less
privacy-preserving model than that of an average end-user [27]. For example, Mozilla warns
potential beta users of its Firefox browser that “Pre-release versions automatically send
Telemetry data to Mozilla to help us improve Firefox1”; Google has a similar provision for
the beta testers of the Canary build of the Chrome browser2.
For these users — we call them the opt-in group, the trusted curator privacy model
is a natural match. For all other users — we call them clients, the local privacy model is
appropriate. Our goal is to demonstrate that by separating the user pool into these two
groups, according to their trust (or lack thereof) in the data aggregator, we can improve
the utility of the collected data. We dub this new model the hybrid differential privacy model.
Enabling local search: Much of the work in this paper is motivated by the idea of local
search. As a browser maker, how can you collect information about users’ clicks, as they
interact with search engines and use that data to create the head of the search, which is the
collection of the most popular queries and their corresponding URLs. Local search results
can be obtained by observing the browser interactions with one or several existing search
engines.
Note that search results may also be computed by combining the results obtained from
user interactions that stem from several search engines, depending on the context. For
instance, the user’s current geographic location may lead us to surface results obtained from
Baidu and not Bing. With proper privacy measures in place, this data set can be deployed
in the end-user browser to serve the most common queries with a very low latency or in
situations when the user is disconnected from the network.
Local search can be thought of as a form of caching, where many queries are answered in
a manner that does not require a round trip to the server. Others have observed that queries
to a search engine follow a power-law distribution [8], which is far from uniform, so caching
1https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/privacy/firefox/
2https://www.chromium.org/getting-involved/dev-channel
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the most frequently used queries locally will have a disproportionately positive impact on the
expected query latency [30, 7]. Furthermore, today there are plenty of data that is delivered
to the browser, such as SafeBrowsing malware databases in Chrome and Firefox, Microsoft
SmartScreen data in Internet Explorer, blocking lists for extensions such as AdBlock Plus, etc.
Utility challenges: The general category to which local search belongs is the problem
of heavy hitter estimation. This is a well-studied problem in the context of information
retrieval. Heavy hitter discovery is one of the canonical problems in privacy-preserving data
analysis [10, 24]. Moreover, the recent work in the LDP model is focused on precisely that
problem [15, 29] or very closely related ones of histogram computations [9, 20]. However,
we argue that current privacy-preserving approaches in that model lead to utility losses
that are quite significant, to a point where the results are no longer usable. Clearly, if
the privacy-preserving perturbation makes the data deviate too far from the original, the
approach will not be adopted. This is especially true in the context of search tasks, where
users have been conditioned for years to expect high-quality results.
Applications: We consider two specific applications in the general space of finding heavy
hitters: search trend computation and local search. Search trend computation entails finding
the most popular queries and sorting them in order of popularity; think about it as the
top-10 computation based on local search observations. Local search involves computing on
query-URL pairs, where the URLs are those clicked as a result of submitting the query and
receiving a set of answers. We fully realize that while trend computation is interesting, local
search is a great deal harder to do well on, while preserving most of the utility. Luckily, in
the domain of search quality, there are some metrics developed to numerically assess the
quality of search results; one of such metrics is NDCG, and we rely on it heavily in assessing
the performance of our proposed system.
1.1. Contributions. Our paper makes the following contributions:
• An introduction and utilization of a more realistic, hybrid trust model, which removes
the need for all users to trust a central curator.
• We propose Blender, an algorithm that operates with the hybrid differential privacy
model for computing heavy hitters. Blender blends the data of opt-in and all other
users in order to improve the resulting utility.
• We test Blender on two common applications: search trend computation and local search
and find that it preserves high levels of utility while maintaining differential privacy for
reasonable privacy parameter values.
• As part of Blender, we propose an approach for automatically balancing the data
obtained from participation of opt-in users with that of other users to maximize the
eventual utility.
• We perform a comprehensive utility evaluation of Blender on two large search click
data sets, comprising 1.75 and 16 GB, demonstrating that Blender maintains very high
level of utility (i.e., NDCG values in excess of 95% across a range of parameters).
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2. Background
We focus on how to utilize decentralized click data that can be obtained from instrumented
clients such as web browsers or cell phones to create differentially private data sets. More
specifically, a browser may collect interactions with a search engine such as Google, Bing,
Baidu, or Yandex and use that data to form an up-to-date approximation of the head of the
search log, i.e., the most popular search queries. These queries can then be treated in a special
way in order to optimize the expected latencies. While others have considered P2P search
engine designs [33, 28], we have not seen attempts to build these in a privacy-preserving
manner. While Blender is in the general space of heavy hitter computation, we foresee
two primary applications of Blender.
Trend Computation: Search trend computation is a typical example of heavy hitter estima-
tion. An example of this is the Google trends service3, which has an always up-to-date list
of trending topics and queries.
Local Search: Local search is an approach to computing the head of the query log (the most
popular query terms and the corresponding URLs) in a distributed fashion, by observing user
interactions with search engines such as Google, Bing, Yandex, etc. The resulting aggregate
query-to-URL mapping can then be delivered to the client, such as a mobile device or a
browser, to answer the most common queries very quickly. This is not dissimilar to how
local search is already done in some applications on mobile devices, where the names and
details of local businesses are pre-fetched for easy retrieval as the user moves around with
the device.
3. Overview
We now discuss the curator models that will form the basis of our hybrid model in more
detail, provide a high-level overview of our proposed system, Blender, that coordinates
the privatization, collection and aggregation of data in this model, and discuss some of the
specific choices we make in this system. We use the task of enabling local search based on
user histories while preserving differential privacy throughout, but, as will become clear from
the discussion, our model and system can be applied to other frequency-based estimation
tasks as well.
3.1. Differential Privacy and Curator Models. In the last decade, we have witnessed
scores of ad-hoc approaches that have turned out to be inadequate for protecting privacy.
The problem stems from the impossibility of foreseeing all attacks of adversaries capable
of utilizing outside knowledge. Differential privacy, which has become the gold standard
privacy guarantee in the academic literature, and is gaining traction in industry and
government [15, 18, 25], overcomes the prior issues by focusing on the privatization algorithm
applied to the data, requiring that it preserves privacy in a mathematically rigorous sense
under an assumption of an omnipotent adversary.
Most differentially private algorithms developed to date operate in the central curator
model : all users’ private data is collected by the curator before privatization techniques
3https://www.google.com/trends/
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are applied to it. This means the curator gets to observe the users’ private data, even
if the subsequent analyses are performed on privatized data. However, as most recently
argued by Apple [18], users may not trust the data collector with their data, and may prefer
privatization to occur before their data reaches the collector. This is known as the local
model, since privatization occurs locally.
Although it may seem counter-intuitive, it is possible to obtain useful insights even
when the data collector does not have access to the original data and receives only data
that has already been locally privatized. Suppose a data collector wants to determine the
proportion of the population that is HIV-positive. The local privatization algorithm works
as follows: each person contributing data secretly flips a biased coin. If the coin lands
heads, they report their true HIV status; otherwise, they report a status at random. This
algorithm, known as randomized response [36], guarantees each person plausible deniability
and is differentially private (with privacy parameters determined by the bias of the coin).
But since the randomness is incorporated into the algorithm in a precisely specified way, the
data collector is able to recover an estimate of the true proportion of HIV-positive people if
enough people contribute their locally privatized data.
Current differential privacy literature considers the central cura-
tor model and the local model entirely independently. Our goal in
this paper is to show that there is much to be gained by combining
the two.
Formally, an algorithm A is (, δ)-differentially private [13] if and only if for all neigh-
boring databases D and D′ differing in precisely one user’s data, the following inequality is
satisfied for all possible sets of outputs Y ⊆ Range(A):
Pr[A(D) ∈ Y ] ≤ e Pr[A(D′) ∈ Y ] + δ.
The definition of what it means for an algorithm to preserve differential privacy is the
same for both the central curator model and the local model. The only distinction is in
the timing of when the privacy perturbation needs to be applied – in the local model, the
data needs to undergo a privacy-preserving perturbation before it is sent to the aggregator,
whereas in the central model the aggregator may first collect all the data, and then apply a
privacy-preserving perturbation. The timing distinction leads to differences in what is meant
by “neighboring databases” in the definition and which algorithms are analyzed. In the local
model, D represents data of a single user and D′ represents data of the same user, with
possibly changed values. In the central curator model, D represents data of all users and
D′ represents data of all users, except one of the user’s values may be altered. Concretely,
for the case of collecting a single search record from each user, the databases in the central
curator models contain a collection of search records and differ in the value of one record,
and the databases in the local model contain one record each.
3.2. A System for the Hybrid Model. As discussed in Section 1, we consider two groups
of users: the opt-in group, who are comfortable with privacy as ensured by the trusted
curator model, and the clients, who desire the privacy guarantees of the local model. Our
proposed system, Blender, coordinates the privatization, collection, and aggregation of the
data from the opt-in and the client users.
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3.2.1. Outline of Our Approach. The core of our innovation is to take advantage of the
privatized information obtained from the opt-in group in order to create a more efficient (in
terms of utility) algorithm for data collection from the clients. Furthermore, the privatized
results obtained from the opt-in group and from the clients are then “blended” in a way
that takes into account the privatization algorithms used for each group, and thus, again,
achieving an improved utility over a less-informed combination of data from the two groups.
Blender
local search datatrend data
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frequency variance
query/url 
pairs
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query/url 
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Figure 1. Architectural diagram of
Blender’s processing steps.
The problem of enabling local search using
past search histories can be viewed as the task
of identifying the most frequent search records
among the population of users, and estimating
their underlying probabilities (both in a differ-
ential privacy-preserving manner). In this con-
text, we call the data collected from the users
search records, where each search record is a
pair of strings of the form 〈query, URL〉, rep-
resenting a query that a user posed followed
by the URL that the user subsequently clicked.
We denote by p〈q,u〉 the true underlying proba-
bility of the search record 〈q, u〉 in the popula-
tion. We assume that our system receives a
sample of users from the population, each hold-
ing their own collection of private data drawn
independently and identically from the distribu-
tion over all records p. Its goal is to output
an estimate pˆ of probabilities of the most fre-
quent search records, while preserving differential
privacy (in the trusted curator model) for the
opt-in users and (in the local model) for the
clients.
Informal Overview of Blender: Figure 1 presents an
architectural diagram of Blender.
Blender serves as the central curator for the opt-
in group of users, and begins by aggregating data from
them. Using a portion of the data, it constructs a can-
didate “head list” of records in a differentially private
manner that approximates the most common search
records in the population. It additionally includes a
single “wildcard” record, 〈?, ?〉, which represents all
records in the population that weren’t previously in-
cluded in the candidate head list. It then uses the
remainder of the opt-in data to estimate the proba-
bility of each record in the candidate head list in a
differentially private manner, then (optionally) trims
the candidate head list down further creating the final
head list. This result of this component of the algo-
rithm is the privatized trimmed head list of search
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records and their corresponding probability and variance estimates, which can be shared
with each user in the client group, as well as with the world.
Each member of the client group receives the head list obtained from the opt-in group.
Each client then individually uses the head list to apply a differential privacy-preserving
perturbation to their data, subsequently reporting their perturbed results to Blender.
Blender then aggregates all the clients’ reports and, using a statistical denoising procedure,
estimates both the probability for each record in the head list as well as the variance of each
of the estimated probabilities based on the clients’ data.
Finally, for each record, Blender combines the record’s probability estimates obtained
from the two groups. It does so by taking a convex combination of the groups’ probability
estimates using their respective variance estimates. Blender outputs the obtained records
and their combined record estimates, which can then be used to drive local search, determine
trends, and more.
A Formal Overview of Blender: Figure 2 presents the precise algorithmic overview of each
step, including key parameters. Lines 1-3 of Blender describe the treatment of data from
opt-in users, line 4 – the treatment of clients, and line 5 – the process for combining the
probability estimates obtained from the two groups. The only distinction between opt-in
users and clients in terms of privacy guarantees provided is the curator model – trusted
curator and local model, respectively. Other than that, both types of users are assumed to
desire the same level of (, δ)-differential privacy.
We will detail our choices for the privatization sub-algorithms and discuss their privacy
properties next. A key feature of Blender, however, is that its privacy properties do not
depend on the specific choices of the sub-algorithms. That is, as long as CreateHeadList,
EstimateOptinProbabilities, and EstimateClientProbabilities each satisfy (, δ)-
differential privacy in its respective curator model, then so does Blender. This allows
changing the sub-algorithms if better versions (utility-wise or implementation-wise) are
discovered in the future. Among the parameters of Blender, the first four (the privacy
parameters and the sets of opt-in and client users) can be viewed as given externally, whereas
the following five (the number of records collected from each user and the distribution of
the privacy budget among the sub-algorithms’ sub-components) can be viewed as knobs
the designer of Blender is at liberty to tweak in order to improve the overall utility of
Blender’s results.
3.2.2. Overview of Blender Sub-Algorithms. We now present the specific choices we made
for the sub-algorithms in Blender. Detailed technical discussions of their properties follow
in Section 4.
Algorithms for Head List Creation and Probability Estimation Based on Opt-in User
Data (Figures 3, 4): The opt-in users are partitioned into two sets – S, whose data will be
used for initial head list creation, and T , whose data will be used to estimate the probabilities
and variances of records from the formed initial head list.
The initial head list creation algorithm, described in Figure 3, constructs the list in a
differentially private manner using search record data from group S. The algorithm follows
the strategy introduced in [23] by aggregating the records of the opt-in users from S, and
including those records whose noisy count exceeds a threshold in the head list. The noise
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Blender (, δ, O,C,mO,mC , fO, fC ,M)
Parameters
• , δ: the differential privacy parameters.
• O,C: the set of opt-in users and clients, respectively.
• mO,mC : the max number of records to collect from each opt-in / client user, respectively.
• fO: the fraction of the opt-in users to use in head list creation (the remainder are used to estimate
the record probabilities).
• fC : the fraction of the clients’ privacy budget to allocate to queries (as opposed to URLs).
• M : the maximum size of the finalized head list.
Variables
• HLS , HL: a map from each query to its corresponding set of URLs.
• pˆO, σˆ2O, pˆC , σˆ2C : vectors indexed by records in HL (and, overloaded to be indexed by queries in HL
as well) containing the probability estimates and variance estimates for each record (and query).
Body
1: Arbitrarily partition O into S and T = O \ S, such that |S| = fO|O| and |T | = (1− fO)|O|.
2: let HLS = CreateHeadList(, δ, S,mO) be the initial head list of records computed based on
opt-in users’ data.
3: let 〈HL, pˆO, σˆ2O〉 = EstimateOptinProbabilities(, δ, T,mO, HLS ,M) be the refined head list of
records, their estimated probabilities, and estimated variances based on opt-in users’ data.
4: let 〈pˆC , σˆ2C〉 = EstimateClientProbabilities(, δ, C,mC , fC , HL) be the estimated record
probabilities and estimated variances based on client reports.
5: let pˆ = BlendProbabilities(pˆO, σˆ
2
O, pˆC , σˆ
2
C , HL) be the combined estimate of record probabilities.
6: return HL, pˆ.
Figure 2. Blender, the server algorithm that coordinates the privatization, col-
lection, and aggregation of data from all users.
to add to the true counts4 and the threshold are calibrated to ensure differential privacy,
using [22]. The goal of the algorithm is to approximate the true set of most frequently
searched and clicked search records as closely as possible, while ensuring differential privacy.
Our algorithm differs from previous work in two ways: 1) it replaces the collection
and thresholding of queries with the collection and thresholding of records (i.e., query -
URL pairs) and 2) its definition of neighboring databases is that of databases differing in
one user’s record values, rather than in the removal of one user’s data. These distinctions
necessitate the choice of mO = 1 as well as higher values for noise and threshold than in [22].
For those records included in the initial head list set, the algorithm described in Figure 4
uses the remaining opt-in users’ data (from set T ) to differentially privately estimate each
record’s probability, denoted pˆO. The M most frequent records in pˆO are retained to form
the final head list. This algorithm is the standard Laplace mechanism from the differential
privacy literature [13], with scale of noise calibrated to our definition of neighboring datasets.
Our implementation ensures (, 0)-differential privacy, which is a more stringent privacy
guarantee than for any non-zero δ. We need to set mO = 1 for the privacy guarantees to
hold, because we treat data at the search record rather than query level.
Finally, the head list is passed to the client group, and the head list and its probability
and variance estimates are passed to the BlendProbabilities step of Blender.
4Whenever we refer to noise as Lap(b), we mean a random draw from the Laplace distribution with scale b.
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CreateHeadList(, δ, S,mO)
Parameters
• , δ: the differential privacy parameters.
• S: a set of opt-in users.
• mO: the maximum number of records to collect from each opt-in user.
Body
1: let N(r,D) = number of times an arbitrary record r appears in the given dataset D.
2: for each user i ∈ S do
3: let DS,i be the database aggregating at most mO arbitrary records from i.
4: let DS be the concatenation of all DS,i databases.
5: let HLS be an empty map.
6: bS =
2mO

.
7: τ = bs ·
(
ln(exp( 
2
) +mO − 1)− ln(δ)
)
.
8: Assert τ ≥ 1.
9: for each distinct 〈q, u〉 ∈ DS do
10: let Y be an independent draw from Lap(bS).
11: if N(〈q, u〉, DS) + Y > τ then
12: Add q to HLS if q 6∈ HLS .
13: Append u to HLS [q].
14: Add 〈?, ?〉 to HLS .
15: return HLS .
Figure 3. Algorithm for creating the head list from a portion opt-in users in a
privacy-preserving way.
The choice of how to split opt-in users into the sub-groups of S and T and the choice
of M are unrelated to privacy constraints, and can be chosen by Blender’s developer to
optimize utility goals, as will be discussed in Section 5.3.1.
Algorithms for client data collection (Figures 5, 6): Figure 5 defines the algorithm for the
client group. Here, records are no longer treated as a single entity, but rather in a two-stage
process: first privatizing the query, then privatizing the URL. This helps optimize utility
in the setting where the number of queries is significantly larger than the number of URLs
associated with each query. Privatization as achieved by following the strategy analogous to
that of the Exponential Mechanism introduced by [26], and utilizes the head list obtained
from the opt-in group in order to perform the privatization locally by each client. At its core,
the privatization is achieved by reporting the true record with a certain bounded probability,
and otherwise, randomizing the report among all the other records in the head list.
The fact that the head list (approximating the set of the most frequent records) is
available to each client plays a crucial role in improving the utility of the data produced by
this privatization algorithm compared to the previously known algorithms operating in the
local privacy model. This allows use of the entire privacy budget to report the true value,
rather than having to allocate some of it for estimating an analogue of the head list, as done
in [16, 29]. Another distinction from the standard exponential mechanism is our utilization
of δ.
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EstimateOptinProbabilities(, δ, T,mO, HLS ,M)
Parameters
• , δ: the differential privacy parameters. In fact, this algorithm achieves (, 0)-differential privacy,
which is a stricter privacy guarantee than (, δ)-differential privacy, for all δ > 0.
• T : a set of opt-in users.
• mO: the maximum number of records to collect from each opt-in user.
• HLS : the initial head list of records whose probabilities are to be estimated.
• M : the maximum size of the finalized head list.
Body
1: let N(r,D) = number of times an arbitrary record r appears in the given dataset D.
2: for each user i ∈ T do
3: let DT,i be the database aggregating at most mO arbitrary records from i.
4: let DT be the concatenation of all DT,i databases.
5: Transform any record 〈q, u〉 ∈ DT that doesn’t appear in HLS into 〈?, ?〉.
6: let pˆO be a vector indexed by records in HLS containing the respective probability estimates.
7: let σˆ2O be a vector indexed by records in HLS containing variance estimates of the respective
probability estimate.
8: Denote |DT | as the total number of records in DT .
9: let bT =
2mO

.
10: for each 〈q, u〉 ∈ HLS do
11: let Y be an independent draw from Lap(bT ).
12: pˆO,〈q,u〉 = 1|DT | (N(〈q, u〉, DT ) + Y ).
13: σˆ2O,〈q,u〉 =
pˆO,〈q,u〉(1−pˆO,〈q,u〉)
|DT |−1 +
2b2T
|DT |·(|DT |−1) .
14: let HL map the M queries with the highest estimated marginal probabilities (according to pˆO) to
their respective sets of URLs.
15: For the records not retained in HL, accumulate their estimated probabilities into pˆO,〈?,?〉 and
update σˆ2O,〈?,?〉 as in line 13.
16: return HL, pˆO, σˆ
2
O.
Figure 4. Algorithm for privacy-preserving estimation of probabilities of records in
the head list from a portion of opt-in users.
Note that the choices of mC and fC are not related to privacy constraints, and can be
chosen by Blender’s developer to optimize utility goals, as will be discussed in Section 5.3.1.
The local nature of the reporting, using a randomization procedure that can report
any record with some probability, induces a predictable bias to the distribution of reported
records. To account for this, a denoising procedure must be performed in order to compute
proper estimates.
These probability estimates, denoted pˆC , along with variance estimates are then passed
to the BlendProbabilities part of Blender. The technical discussion of the algorithm’s
privacy properties and variance estimate computations follow in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.
Algorithm for Blending (Figure 7): The blending portion of the algorithm combines the
estimates produced by the opt-in and client probability-estimation algorithms by taking into
account the sizes of the groups and the amount of noise each algorithm respectively added.
This produces a blended probability estimates pˆ which, in expectation, is more accurate than
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EstimateClientProbabilities(, δ, C,mC , fC , HL)
Parameters
• , δ: the differential privacy parameters.
• C: the set of clients.
• mC : the number of records to collect from the client.
• fC : the fraction of the privacy budget to allocate to reporting queries.
• HL: a map from each query to its corresponding set of URLs.
Body
1: Append query q = ? to HL.
2: for each query q ∈ HL do
3: Append URL u = ? to HL[q].
4: for each client i ∈ C do
5: let DC,i = LocalAlg(, δ,mC , fC , HL) be the reports from i’s local execution of LocalAlg.
6: let DC be the concatenation of all reported client datasets, DC,i.
7: Denote |DC | as the total number of records in DC .
8: let variables ′Q, 
′
U , δ
′
Q, δ
′
U , k, t, kq, tq(∀q ∈ HL) be defined as in lines 2–4 of LocalAlg.
9: let rˆC , pˆC , σˆ
2
C be vectors indexed by records in HL (and overloading its use, also indexed by
queries).
10: for q ∈ HL do
11: let rˆC,q be the fraction of queries q in DC .
12: pˆC,q =
rˆC,q− 1−tk−1
t− 1−t
k−1
13: σˆ2C,q =
1(
t− 1−t
k−1
)2 rˆC,q(1−rˆC,q)|DC |−1
14: for u ∈ HL[q] do
15: let rˆC,〈q,u〉 be the fraction of records which are 〈q, u〉 in DC .
16:
pC,〈q,u〉 =
rˆC,〈q,u〉 −
(
t
1−tq
kq−1 pˆC,q +
1−t
k−1
1
kq
(1− pˆC,q)
)
t(tq − 1−tqkq−1 )
17:
σˆ2C,〈q,u〉 =
|DC |
t2
(
tq − 1−tqkq−1
)2
(|DC | − 1)
·
( rˆC,〈q,u〉(1− rˆC,〈q,u〉)
|DC | +
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)2
σˆ2C,q + 2
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)( rˆC,〈q,u〉(1− rˆC,q)
|DC |(t− 1−tk−1 )
))
18: return pˆC , σˆ
2
C .
Figure 5. Algorithm for estimating probabilities of records in the head list from
the locally privatized reports of the client users.
either group produced individually. The procedure for blending is not subject to privacy con-
straints, as it operates on the data whose privacy has already been ensured by previous steps
of Blender. The motivation and technical discussion of this algorithm follows in Section 4.3.
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LocalAlg(, δ,mC , fC , HL)
Parameters
• , δ: the differential privacy parameters.
• mC : the number of records to collect from the client.
• fC : the fraction of the privacy budget to allocate to reporting queries.
• HL: the head list, represented as a map keyed by queries {q1, . . . , qk, ?}. The value for each q ∈ HL
is defined as HL[q] = {u1, . . . , ul, ?}, representing all URLs in the head list associated with q.
Body
1: let DC,i be the database aggregating at most mC records from current client i.
2: ′ = /mC , and δ′ = δ/mC .
3: ′Q = fC
′, ′U = 
′ − ′Q and δ′Q = fCδ′, δ′U = δ′ − δ′Q.
4: k = |HL|, and t = exp(
′
Q)+(δ
′
Q/2)(k−1)
exp(′
Q
)+k−1 .
5: for each q ∈ HL do:
6: kq = |HL[q]|, and tq = exp(
′
U )+(δ
′
U/2)(kq−1)
exp(′
U
)+kq−1 .
7: for each 〈q, u〉 ∈ DC,i do
8: if q 6∈ HL then
9: Set q = ?.
10: if u 6∈ HL[q] then
11: Set u = ?.
12: With probability (1− t),
13: let q′ be a unif. random query from HL \ q.
14: let u′ be a unif. random URL from HL[q′].
15: report 〈q′, u′〉.
16: continue
17: With probability (1− tq),
18: let u′ be a unif. random URL from HL[q] \ u.
19: report 〈q, u′〉.
20: continue
21: report 〈q, u〉.
Figure 6. Algorithm executed by each client for privately reporting their records.
4. Technical Details
We now present further technical details related to the instantiations of the sub-algorithms
for Blender, such as privacy proofs and the motivation for BlendProbabilities.
4.1. Opt-in Data Algorithms. Differential privacy of the algorithms handling opt-in
client data follows directly from previous work.
Theorem 4.1. ([22]) CreateHeadList guarantees (, δ)-differential privacy if mO = 1,  >
ln(2), and τ ≥ 1.
Theorem 4.2. ([13]) EstimateOptinProbabilities guarantees (, 0)-differential privacy
if mO = 1.
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BlendProbabilities(pˆO, σˆ
2
O, pˆC , σˆ
2
C , HL)
Parameters
• pˆO, pˆC : the probability estimates from the opt-in and client algorithms.
• σˆO, σˆC : the variance estimates from the opt-in and client algorithms.
• HL: the head list of records.
Body
1: let pˆ be a vector indexed by records in HL.
2: for 〈q, u〉 ∈ HL do
3: w〈q,u〉 =
σˆ2C,〈q,u〉
σˆ2
O,〈q,u〉+σˆ
2
C,〈q,u〉
.
4: pˆ〈q,u〉 = w〈q,u〉 · pˆO,〈q,u〉 + (1− w〈q,u〉) · pˆC,〈q,u〉.
5: Optional: Project pˆ onto probability simplex (e.g., see [35]).
6: return pˆ.
Figure 7. Algorithm for combining record probability estimates from opt-in and
client estimates.
4.2. Client Data Algorithms. LocalAlg is responsible for the privacy-preserving per-
turbation of each client’s data before it gets sent to the server and EstimateClientProba-
bilities is responsible for aggregating the received privatized data into a meaningful statistic.
We prove the privacy and explain the logic behind the aggregation procedure next.
Theorem 4.3. LocalAlg is (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reports aggregated by the client mechanism form an empirical distribution over the
records (and queries). This distribution is biased in an explicit way, as described by the
reporting process, creating a significantly flatter distribution relative to the true underlying
distribution. Since the noise addition process is known, the bias is also known, and can
be used to “unflatten” the distribution as a post-processing step to obtain a more useful,
unbiased estimate of the record distribution. We refer to this as “denoising” the reported
empirical distribution rˆC to obtain the final estimate from the client algorithm, pˆC .
Observation 4.4. pˆC gives the unbiased estimate of record and query probabilities under
EstimateClientProbabilities.
Proof. See Appendix.
4.3. Blending. The opt-in algorithm and client algorithm both output independent esti-
mates pˆO and pˆC of the record distribution p. The question we address now is how to best
combine these estimates using the information available.
A standard way to measure the quality of an estimate is by its variance. Although
it may seem natural to choose the estimate with lower variance as the final estimate pˆ,
it is possible to achieve a better estimate by jointly utilizing the information provided by
both algorithms. This is because the errors in these estimates come from different sources.
The error in the estimates obtained from the opt-in algorithm is due to the addition of
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Laplace noise, whereas the error in the estimates obtained from the client algorithm is due
to randomizing the true record over the set of records in the head list. Thus, our goal is to
determine the variances of the estimates obtained from the two algorithms and use these
variances to blend the estimates in the best way.
More formally, for each record 〈q, u〉 let σ2O,〈q,u〉 and σ2C,〈q,u〉 be the variances of the opt-in
and client algorithms estimates of pˆO,〈q,u〉 and pˆC,〈q,u〉 respectively. Since these variances
depend on the underlying distribution, which is unknown a priori, we will compute sample
variances σˆ2O,〈q,u〉 and σˆ
2
O,〈q,u〉 instead. For each record 〈q, u〉, we will weight the estimate from
the opt-algorithm by w〈q,u〉 and the estimate from the client algorithm by (1−w〈q,u〉), where
w〈q,u〉 is defined as in line 3 of BlendProbabilities. The optional step of projecting the
blended estimates (e.g., as in [35]) ensures that the estimates sum to 1 and are non-negative.
Theorem 4.5 presents our computation of the sample variance of EstimateOptin-
Probabilities, Theorem 4.6 presents our computation of the sample variance of Esti-
mateClientProbabilities, and Theorem 4.7 motivates the weighting scheme used in
BlendProbabilities.
For the variance derivations, we make an explicit assumption that each piece of reported
data is drawn independently and identically from the same underlying distribution. This is
reasonable when comparing data across users. By setting mO = mC = 1, we remove the need
to assume iid data within each user’s own data, while simplifying our variance computations.
We show in Section 5 that Blender achieves high utility even when mO = mC = 1.
Theorem 4.5. If mO = 1 then the unbiased variance estimate for the opt-in group’s record
probabilities can be computed as: σˆ2O,〈q,u〉 =
|DT |
|DT |−1
(
pˆO,〈q,u〉(1−pˆO,〈q,u〉)
|DT | + 2
(
bT
|DT |
)2)
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that in line 15 of EstimateOptinProbabilities, the use of this sample variance
expression in re-computing σˆ2O,〈?,?〉 is not statistically valid, so our computation of pˆO,〈?,?〉
and pˆ〈?,?〉 is sub-optimal. Despite that, our overall utility, which does not include ?, is good
(see Section 5).
Theorem 4.6. If mC = 1 then the unbiased variance estimate for the client group’s record
probabilities can be computed as:
σˆ2C,〈q,u〉 =
|DC |
t2
(
tq − 1−tqkq−1
)2
(|DC | − 1)
·
( rˆC,〈q,u〉(1− rˆC,〈q,u〉)
|DC | +
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)2
σˆ2C,q + 2
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
) rˆC,〈q,u〉(1− rˆC,q)
|DC |(t− 1−tk−1 )
)
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Theorem 4.7. If σˆ2O,〈q,u〉 and σˆ
2
C,〈q,u〉 are sample variances of pˆO,〈q,u〉 and pˆC,〈q,u〉 respectively,
and the blended estimate is the convex combination pˆ〈q,u〉 = w〈q,u〉·pˆO,〈q,u〉+(1−w〈q,u〉)·pˆC,〈q,u〉,
then the sample variance optimal weighting is given by w〈q,u〉 =
σˆ2
C,〈q,u〉
σˆ2
O,〈q,u〉+σˆ
2
C,〈q,u〉
.
Proof. See Appendix.
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4.4. Discussion. We have intentionally used (slight modifications) of existing algorithms for
Blender’s sub-algorithms in order to demonstrate the power of the blended approach within
the hybrid privacy model. However, it is conceivable that the sub-algorithms themselves can
be improved further, yielding further improvements in the utility achieved by Blender.
Operating in the hybrid model is most beneficial utility-wise if the opt-in user records
and client user records come from the same distribution – i.e., the two groups have fairly
similar observed search behavior. If that is not the case, the differential privacy guarantees
still hold, but the accuracy of Blender’s estimates may decrease.
5. Experimental Evaluation
5.1. Utility Metrics. One pitfall in much of the research in the area of differential privacy is
an insufficient emphasis on the utility loss due to privacy constraints. We designed Blender
with an eye toward preserving the utility of the eventual results in the two applications we
explore in this paper: trend computation and local search, as described in Section 2. We use
two domain-specific utility metrics to assess the loss of utility, the L1 metric and NDCG.
L1: L1 is the Manhattan distance between the estimate and actual probability vectors, in
other words, L1 =
∑
i |pˆi − pi|. The smaller the L1, the better.
NDCG: NDCG is a standard measure of search quality [19, 32] that takes into account
the order of queries by performing discounting. In particular, most popular queries at the
head of the search have a higher weight, whereas the relative significance of the less popular
queries is reduced. The relevance, or gain, of an item at position i in the ranked list is
measured using a graded relevance score defined as rel i =
ni∑
j nj
, where nj is the number of
occurrences of the item in position j in the given dataset. The closer i’s estimated rank is
to its true rank, the larger the gain. For a head of k top elements, the estimated rank list is
computed as DCGk =
∑k
i=1
2reli−1
log2(i+1)
.
Here, the discounting happens because of the log2(i) factor that diminishes the effect of
later queries. This value is normalized by the Ideal DCG (IDCGk), in which the estimated
and the actual ranking are exactly the same, to obtain a value that ranges between 0 and 1.
Since we operate on records rather than just queries, we utilize a generalization of
the traditional NDCG score. Here, we compute the NDCG of each query’s URL list,
NDCGq, as specified above, and then compute the DCG of the queries as DCGQk =∑k
i=1
2reli−1
log2(i+1)
·NDCGi.
The final NDCG computation is then DCGQk normalized by the analogous Ideal DCG
(IDCGQk ). In a way, our computation considers an NDCG of NDCGs, which makes it even
harder for us to maintain consistently high NDCG values when compared to the query-only
case. This formulation takes the ranking and frequencies from the data set into account, not
the actual score that our algorithm outputs. Since changes to the score may not result in
ranking changes, L1 is an even less forgiving measure than NDCG.
Since the purpose of Blender is to estimate probabilities of the top records, we discard
the artificially added ? queries and URLs and rescale reli prior to L1 and NDCG computa-
tions. However, since we use the method of [35] in BlendProbabilities, the probability
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estimates involving ? have a minor implicit effect on the L1 and NDCG scores.
5.2. Experimental Setup. For our experiments, we use the AOL search logs, released
in 2006 and the Yandex search data set5, released in 2013. Figure 8 describes their charac-
teristics.
AOL Yandex
Data set on disk 1.75 GB 16 GB
Unique queries 4,811,646 13,171,961
Unique clients 519,371 4,970,073
Unique URLs 1,620,064 12,702,350
Figure 8. Data set statistics.
Data analysis: To familiarize the reader with the approach we used for assessing result
quality, Figure 9 shows the top-10 most frequent queries in the AOL data set, with the
estimates given by the different “ingredients” of Blender.
The table is sorted by column 2, which contains the non-private, empirical probabilities
from the AOL data set with 1 random record sampled from each user. Column 3 contains
the final query probability estimates outputted by Blender. Each algorithm computes
probability estimates over the records in the head list; to obtain query probability estimates
from these, we simply aggregate the probabilities associated with each URL for a given query
(columns 4 and 6). The sample variance of these aggregated probabilities, used for blending,
is naively computed as in Theorem 4.5. Column 5 is the EstimateClientProbabilities’
estimate of the query probabilities, since it directly computes these values. While column 6
is not used for blending in trend computation (where only query probability estimates are
produced), columns 4, 5, and 6 are used by the full Blender algorithm when it comes
to blending entire records. Regressions, i.e., estimates that appear out of order relative to
column 2, are shown in red.
The biggest takeaway is that the numbers in columns 2 and 3 are similar to each other,
with Blender’s usage resulting in only one regression.
Blender compensates for the weaknesses of both the opt-in and the client estimates.
Specifically, despite the opt-in group having several regressions, combining the opt-in and
client-data compensates for that, resulting in only one regression.
Despite the high number of regressions for the client algorithm’s aggregated record prob-
ability estimates (Column 6), its query probability estimates (Column 5) only generate one
regression. This demonstrates the usefulness of deploying a two-stage reporting process in
the client algorithm (first report a query and then the URL), thus allowing for separate
estimates of query and record probabilities.
5.3. Experimental Results. We formulate questions for our evaluation as follows: how to
choose Blender’s parameters (Section 5.3.1), how does Blender perform compared to
alternatives (Section 5.3.2), and how robust are our findings (Section 5.3.3)?
5https://www.kaggle.com/c/yandex-personalized-web-search-challenge/data
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AOL Blender Opt-in Client Client
Query dataset estimate estimate estimate estimate
prob pˆq
∑
u pˆO,〈q,u〉 pˆC,q
∑
u pˆC,〈q,u〉
? 0.9108 0.9103 0.9199 0.9100 0.1468
google 0.0213 0.0216 0.0213 0.0217 0.0216
yahoo 0.0067 0.0070 0.0046 0.0073 0.0325
google.com 0.0067 0.0056 0.0023 0.0061 0.0194
myspace.com 0.0057 0.0052 0.0022 0.0057 0.0258
mapquest 0.0054 0.0051 0.0062 0.0053 0.0192
yahoo.com 0.0043 0.0043 0.0021 0.0048 0.0192
www.google.com 0.0034 0.0004 0.0004 0.0032 0.0098
myspace 0.0033 0.0034 0.0042 0.0035 0.0255
ebay 0.0028 0.0026 0.0028 0.0028 0.0254
Figure 9. Comparison of probability estimates for top-10 most popular AOL queries.
Parameter choices are shown in Figure 11.
5.3.1. Algorithmic and Parameter Choices. Blender has more than a handful of parameters,
some of which can be viewed as given externally (by the laws of nature, so to speak), and
others whose choice is purely up to the entity that’s deploying Blender. We now describe
and, whenever possible, motivate, our choices for these.
Privacy parameters,  and δ: We view  and δ as privacy parameters given to us externally
(e.g., by what is a common practice for differentially private algorithms in the industry [31,
5, 15]). We use a δ that is larger for the AOL dataset than for the Yandex dataset to reflect
that the Yandex dataset contains data of more users.
We use the same  and δ values for the opt-in and client users. From a behavioral per-
spective, this reduces a user’s opt-in decision down to one purely of trust towards the curator.
Opt-in and client group sizes, |O| and |C|: The relative sizes of opt-in group and client
group, |O| and |C|, respectively, can be viewed as exogenous variables which are dictated by
the trust that users place in the search engine6. We choose 5% for AOL and 3% for Yandex
for the fraction of opt-in users as compared to total users because these seem reasonable and
because these levels of trust to the curator allow us to effectively demonstrate the utility
benefits of algorithms that are designed to operate in the hybrid privacy model.
The number of records to collect from each opt-in user, mO = 1: This is a choice necessi-
tated by the privacy constraints of the CreateHeadList algorithm.
The choices for remaining parameters: mC , fC , fO,M are driven purely by utility considera-
tions.
6In the future, as differential privacy gains widespread adoption, it is conceivable that the values of the
privacy parameters may affect their relative sizes; for example, the smaller the , the more users are willing
to “opt-in”. However, this relationship is out of the scope of this work.
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Figure 10. Comparing AOL data set results across a range of budget splits for
client, opt-in, and blended results.
The number of records to collect from each client, mC = 1: Across a range of experimental
values, collecting 1 record per user always yielded greatest utility, justifying this parameter
choice. Two factors account for this: 1) the privacy budget must be split across a client’s
reports, and 2) the accuracy of our algorithm relies on uncorrelated reports, which may not
be the case in practice within a given user’s set of records.
How to split the privacy budget between query and url reporting for clients, fC =
0.85: Figure 10 shows the effects of the budget split on both the L1 and NDCG metrics.
Unsurprisingly, Figure 10a shows that the larger the fraction of client algorithm’s budget
dedicated to query estimation as opposed to URL estimation, the better the L1 score for
the client and Blender results. The NDCG metric in Figure 10b shows a trade-off that
emerges as we assign more budget to the queries, de-emphasizing the URLs. The client
algorithm NDCG value peaks at a budget split of 0.85; choosing a split above this point
induces a significant drop in the blended NDCG values. Note that the grey opt-in line in
Figure 10b is constant, as the opt-in group is not affected by the budget split.
What fraction of opt-in data to use for creating the headlist, fO = 0.95: We choose
fO = 0.95 because our goal is to build a large candidate head list, and unless we allocate
most of the opt-in user data to building such a head list (algorithm CreateHeadList), our
subsequent results may be accurate but apply only to a small number of records, whereas in
order to speak of an effective local search application in practice we need to amass a headlist
of at least double or triple digits in size. Even without looking at experimental data, this
choice makes sense: our opt-in group size is small relative to our client group size, and it is
difficult to generate a head list in the local privacy model – so it makes sense to utilize most
of the opt-in group’s data for the task that is most difficult in the local model.
What should be the final size of the set for which we provide probability estimates, M :
The choice of M is influenced by competing considerations. The larger the head list for
which we provide the probability estimates, the more effective the local search application
(subject to those probability estimates being accurate). However, as desired head list size
increases, the accuracy of our estimates drops (most notably due to client data privatization).
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Figure 12. Comparing to the results in the CCS’16 paper by Qin et. al. across a
range of  values; head list size=10.
We want to strike a balance that allows us to get a sensibly large record set with reasonably
accurate probability estimates it. We choose M = 50 and M = 500 for the AOL and Yandex
datasets, to reflect their differing sizes.
Parameter AOL Yandex
 4 4
δ 10−5 10−7
|O|
|O|+|C| 5% 3%
mO 1 1
mC 1 1
fO 0.95 0.95
fC 0.85 0.85
M 50 500
Figure 11. Parameters.
Subsequently, we use the parameters shown in Figure 11,
unless explicitly stated.
5.3.2. Utility Comparison to Alternatives. The closest related
work is a recent paper by Qin et. al. [29] in which they provide
a utility evaluation of their state-of-the-art algorithm on the
AOL data set for the headlist size of 10. Given the NDCG
data that they make available in the paper, we perform a
direct comparison with Blender across  values. We plot
the outcome of the comparison in Figure 12, which shows the
NDCG values achieved by Blender and by Qin et. al. [29] for
 values between 1–5. Across the entire range of the privacy
parameter, our NDCG values are above 95%, whereas the reported NDCG values for
Qin et. al. are in the 30% range, at best. We believe that given the intense focus on search
optimization in the field of information retrieval, NDCG values as low as those of Qin et. al.
are generally unusable. Overall, Blender significantly outperforms what we believe to be
the closest related research project.
Qin et. al. and this work use different scoring functions. Qin et. al. use a relevance score
based purely on the rank of queries in the original AOL data set; this results in penalizing
misranked queries regardless of their underlying probabilities. Blender’s relevance scoring
only relies on the underlying probabilities, so misranked items with similar underlying
probabilities only have a small negative impact on the overall NDCG score; we believe this
choice is justified. While it yields increased NDCG scores, Blender operates on records
(rather than queries, as Qin et. al. does). Because of this, the “NDCG of NDCGs” score used
to evaluate Blender (Section 5.1) is a strictly less forgiving metric than the traditional
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Figure 13. L1 as a function of the opt-in percentage.
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Figure 14. L1 statistics for AOL and Yandex data sets for various head list sizes
and a range of  values.
NDCG score. Thus, although simultaneously compensating for both differences would yield
the ideal comparison, the comparison in Figure 12 is reasonable.
5.3.3. Robustness. We now discuss how the size of the opt-in group and the choice of the 
privacy parameter affect Blender’s utility.
Evaluation of trend computation: Figure 137 shows the L1 values as a function of the
opt-in percentage ranging between 1% and 10%.
We believe that requiring opt-in percentages in excess of 10% is likely to put undue
strain on the system in terms of recruitment; simply put, finding enough opt-in users may
provide difficult or impossible in the long run. We see slight differences in the two data
sets and across the various head list sizes. Some of the differences might be due to the fact
that given the relatively small size of the AOL data set, we need to consider higher opt-in
percentages to get reasonably sized head lists and L1 values. In fact, when we increase
7Portions of lines do not appear on figures if the desired head list size was not reached (e.g., in Figure 13a,
the line representing results for a head list of size 50 does not begin until 5% because a head list of size 50
could not be generated with a lower opt-in percentage).
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Figure 15. NDCG as a function of the opt-in percentage.
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Figure 16. NDCG statistics for AOL and Yandex data sets for various head list
sizes and a range of  values.
the opt-in percentage to 10% for the AOL data set, we see a slight decline in L1 values for
the largest head list size similar to what is observed in Figure 13b for the Yandex data set.
If our goal is to have head lists of 500+, we see that with the larger Yandex data set, an
opt-in percentage as small as 3% is sufficient. The main take-away from this is that when
the opt-in group is large enough to attain the desired head list size, the trend computation
results generally will be high quality in terms of the L1 values.
Figure 14 shows the L1 values as a function of , ranging from 1 to 6. For both data
sets, we see a steady decline in the L1 metric, despite aggregating L1 values over longer
estimate vectors. With more data in the Yandex data set, we are able to hit small values of
L1 (under 0.1) with  ≥ 1.
Evaluation of local search computation: Figure 15 shows the NDCG measurements as
a function of the opt-in percentage ranging between 1% and 10%. The results are quite
encouraging; for the smaller AOL data set, we need to have an opt-in level of ≈5% to achieve
an NDCG level in excess of 95%, which we regard as acceptable. However, for the larger
Yandex data set, we hit that NDCG level even sooner: for an opt-in group composing 1% of
the users, the NDCG level is above 95% for all but the largest head list size.
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Figure 17. L1 and NDCG statistics broken out between the different groups’ results
on the Yandex data set with head list size 100 across a range of opt-in percentages
and  values.
Figure 16 shows how the NDCG values vary across the two data sets, AOL and Yandex,
for a range of head list sizes and  values. We see a clear trend toward higher NDCG values
for Yandex, which is not surprising given the sheer volume of data. For the Yandex data set,
we can keep  as low as 1 and still achieve NDCG values of 95% and above for all but the
two largest head list sizes. For those, we must increase  in order to generate larger head
lists from the opt-in users.
Each group’s effect on the blended result: While these blended results demonstrate the
system’s high-utility capability, one central question remains: to what extent are each group’s
estimates contributing to the final blended result? Specifically, does the small number of
samples with low noise from the opt-in group dominate the large number of samples with
high noise from the client group, or vice-versa?
For a head list size 100 on the Yandex data set, Figure 17 examines this question for a
range of opt-in percentages and  values. These graphs show a complex relationship between
the two groups’ utility with regards to the final blended result. In all cases, the blended
result is better than the worse of either the opt-in or client results. With regards to L1
distance, the blended result is better than both groups’ individual results when varying either
the opt-in user percentage or the  value.
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Figure 18. L1 and NDCG statistics for the Yandex data set for various head list
sizes across a range of tiny opt-in percentages.
When increasing the opt-in user percentage, the two group’s results behave as expected:
the opt-in group’s results improve as it gains more users, and the client group’s results
gradually deteriorate as it loses users. Interestingly, Figures 17a and b show that the
L1 distance of the client group’s query results deteriorate quite slowly as their group size
decreases, whereas their NDCG results deteriorate more quickly. To understand this behavior,
observe that there are significantly fewer queries (what the query estimate L1 distance is
measuring) than there are query-URL pairs (what the NDCG is measuring). Also note that
the utility of the randomized response component of the local algorithm degrades as the set
of items under consideration increases. These two facts in combination explain the difference
in the deterioration rates of the client group’s utility between Figure 17a and b.
For the blended result, the NDCG values mainly track the opt-in group’s NDCG values
even in the case where the client result is clearly better (from 1% up to 3%); this would
support the idea that the opt-in results may be dominating the client results when it comes
to the blending process. However, this trend doesn’t appear to hold when increasing the ,
as the blended results rapidly improve with the client results, while the opt-in results remain
relatively flat. Interestingly, as  is increased, the opt-in group’s L1 results remain relatively
constant and its NDCG results only slightly improve. This is caused by the large amount
of noise that is inherent in the opt-in group due to its relatively small size; i.e., a 3% sized
opt-in group induces a certain level of sampling error such that the noise introduced for
privacy is negligible by comparison.
The takeaway is that there is no single clear-cut group that dominates in its contribution
to the final blended result; in fact, both groups appear to contribute across the ranges of
parameters considered.
When the opt-in group is tiny: In the real-world, it may be the case that a 5% or even
a 3% sized opt-in group is still too large to be considered feasible. As mentioned in the
evaluation of trend computation, the utility results are generally good conditioned on the
desired head list size being achieved. When the opt-in group becomes too small, it becomes
a significantly greater challenge to achieve these large head list sizes. For the head list
sizes that we can achieve at smaller opt-in percentages, what are the utility results we can
expect? Figure 18 shows the performance on the Yandex dataset targeting smaller head
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Figure 19. L1 and NDCG statistics broken out per group for the Yandex data set
for head list size 10 and a range of tiny opt-in percentages.
list sizes across opt-in group sizes ranging from 0.1% up to 1%. These results confirm our
previous conclusion that once a head list size can be attained, getting high utility probability
estimates for the records is a significantly easier challenge.
At these tiny opt-in percentages, with 95% of the opt-in group being assigned to head
list creation, only 0.005% to 0.05% of the users are estimating the probabilities under
the trusted curator model. We must ask: in this setting, to what extent are the users
contributing to the high-utility blended results? Figure 19 shows the L1 and NDCG values
for the opt-in group, client group, and final blended results across these tiny opt-in sizes
for a head list of size 10 on the Yandex data set. As suspected, the estimates from the
opt-in group have much lower utility relative to the client group. The blending proce-
dure is able to automatically take advantage of the high variance results of the opt-in
group (stemming from the tiny number of samples used by this group in estimating the
probabilities) and weigh the blending much more heavily towards the client group’s estimates.
6. Related Work
Algorithms for the central curator model: Researchers have developed numerous privacy-
preserving algorithms operating in the central curator model that result in useful data for a
variety of applications. Specifically, the works of [22, 23, 17] address the problem of publishing
a subset of the data contained in a search log with differential privacy guarantees; the works of
[24] and [10] propose approaches for privacy-preserving frequent item identification, and so on.
Algorithms for the local model: Although some progress has been made in developing
privacy-preserving algorithms operating in the local model [36, 12, 15, 9, 34], the utility
of the resulting data is limited [16, 20]. Furthermore, it is known that for fixed desired
differential privacy parameters, the local model’s elimination of the trusted data collector
comes at the cost of diminished utility [21].
Our contribution: Our work significantly improves upon the known results by developing
application-specific local privatization algorithms that work in combination with central
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model algorithms. Specifically, our insight of providing all users with differential privacy
guarantees but achieving it differently depending on whether or not they trust the data
curator, enables an efficient privacy-preserving head list construction. The subsequent usage
of this head list in the algorithm operating in the local model helps overcome one of the main
challenges to utility of privacy-preserving algorithms in the local model [16]. As discussed
in Section 5.3.2, we significantly outperform the most recently introduced local algorithm
of [29] on metrics of utility in the search context.
7. Conclusions
We proposed a hybrid privacy model and a blended approach that operates within it that
combines the upsides of two common models of differential privacy: the local model and
the trusted curator model. Using local search as a motivating application, we demonstrated
that our proposed approach leads to a significant improvement in terms of utility, bridging
the gap between theory and practicality of differential privacy.
Future work: We plan to continue this work in two primary directions: addressing any
theory, design, systems and engineering challenges to Blender’s adoption in practice, and
developing algorithms for other applications that operate in the hybrid privacy model and
can facilitate widespread adoption of differential privacy in practice.
In particular, we plan to address the possibility mentioned in Section 4.4 in which the
opt-in and client groups may have different distributions over their records. As a start, we
plan to evaluate whether the distributions are different using a small sample of records from
both groups in a differentially private manner using the techniques of [1, 4].
We plan to improve the sub-algorithms used in Blender, with an eye towards reducing
the privacy budget or number of users required to obtain high-utility results.
We plan to look for theoretical insights that would enable us to do better blending, i.e.,
not only achieve a higher utility than the worse of the opt-in and client results that we saw
in our experiments, but to understand when the blended result might not be strictly better
than the better of the opt-in or client group’s estimates.
We also plan to provide insights that would allow operators of Blender to estimate
the utility improvements that could be expected at given opt-in rates.
Finally, we plan to explore other application domains in which locally private algorithms
perform poorly and that could benefit from adopting the hybrid privacy model, and develop-
ing new algorithms and analyses that take advantage of it.
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8. Appendix
Theorem 4.3. LocalAlg is (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. We show this by proving that each iteration of the for loop in line 7 of LocalAlg
is (′, δ′)-differentially private, where ′ = /mC and δ′ = δ/mC . Since there are at most mC
iterations of this loop for each client, composition of differentially private mechanisms [14]
guarantees that LocalAlg ensures (, δ)-differential privacy for each client.
Denote each iteration of the for loop in line 7 of LocalAlg by L; it takes as input a
record 〈q, u〉 ∈ D, and returns a record, which we denote L(〈q, u〉). If q is not in HL or u
is not in HL[q], then they immediately get transformed into a default value (?) that is in
the head list. Since L outputs only values that exist in the head list, to confirm differential
privacy we need to prove that for any arbitrary neighboring data sets 〈q, u〉 and 〈q′, u′〉,
Pr
[
L(〈q, u〉) ∈ Y ] ≤ e′ Pr[L(〈q′, u′〉) ∈ Y ]+ δ′ holds for all sets of head list records Y .
Whenever k = 1 or kq = 1, the only query (or URL for a specific query) is ?, which will
be output with probability 1. Thus, differential privacy trivially holds, since the reported
values then do not rely on the client’s data. Thus, we’ll assume k ≥ 2 and kq ≥ 2. Note that
there is a single decision point where it is determined whether q will be reported truthfully
or not. Thus, we can split the privacy analysis into two parts: 1) Usage of the fC fraction of
the privacy budget to report a query, and 2) Usage of the remainder of the privacy budget
to report a URL (given the reported query). This decomposes a simultaneous two-item
(′, δ′) reporting problem into two single-item reporting problems with (′Q, δ
′
Q) and (
′
U , δ
′
U )
respectively, where ′Q = f
′, δ′Q = fδ
′, ′U = (1− fC)′, and δ′U = (1− fC)δ′.
1. Privacy of query reporting: Consider the query-reporting case first. Overloading our
use of L, let L(q) be the portion of L that makes use of q. We first ensure that
Pr[L(q) = qHL] ≤ exp(′Q) Pr[L(q′) = qHL] +
δ′Q
2
(8.1)
holds for all q, q′, and qHL ∈ HL. This trivially holds when qHL = q = q′ or qHL 6∈ {q, q′}.
The remaining scenarios to consider are: 1) q 6= qHL, q′ = qHL and 2) q = qHL, q′ 6= qHL. By
the design of the algorithm, Pr[L(qHL) = qHL] = t and Pr[L(q¯HL) = qHL] = (1− t)( 1k−1),
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where q¯HL represents any query not equal to qHL. With t =
exp(′Q)+(δ
′
Q/2)(k−1)
exp(′Q)+k−1 , it is simple
to verify that inequality (8.1) holds.
Consider an arbitrary set of head list queries Y .
Pr[L(q) ∈ Y ] =
∑
qHL∈Y
Pr[L(q) = qHL]
=
∑
qHL∈Y \{q,q′}
Pr[L(q) = qHL] +
∑
qHL∈Y ∩{q,q′}
Pr[L(q) = qHL]
=
∑
qHL∈Y \{q,q′}
Pr[L(q′) = qHL] +
∑
qHL∈Y ∩q,q′
Pr[L(q) = qHL] (8.2)
≤
∑
qHL∈Y \{q,q′}
Pr[L(q′) = qHL] +
∑
qHL∈Y ∩{q,q′}
(
e
′
Q Pr[L(q′) = qHL] +
δ′Q
2
)
(8.3)
≤ e′Q
∑
qHL∈Y
Pr[L(q′) = qHL] + 2 · δ
′
Q
2
= e
′
Q Pr[L(q′) ∈ Y ] + δ′Q,
Equality (8.2) stems from the fact that the probability of reporting a false query is independent
of the user’s true query. The inequality (8.3) is a direct application of inequality (8.1). Thus,
L is (′Q, δ
′
Q)-differentially private for query-reporting.
2. Privacy of URL reporting: With tq defined as tq =
exp(′U )+0.5δ
′
U (kq−1)
exp(′U )+kq−1 , an analogous
argument shows that the (′U , δ
′
U )-differential privacy constraints hold if the original q is
kept. On the other hand, if it is replaced with a random query, then they trivially hold
as the algorithm reports a random element in the URL list of the reported query, without
taking into consideration the client’s true URL u.
By composition [14], each of the at most mC iterations of L is (
′
Q+
′
U , δ
′
Q+δ
′
U ) = (
′, δ′)-
differentially private.
Observation 4.4. pˆC gives the unbiased estimate of record and query probabilities under
EstimateClientProbabilities.
Proof. Reporting records is a two-stage process (first, decide which query to report, then
report a record); similarly, denoising is also done in two stages.
Denoising of query probability estimates: Let rC,q denote the probability that the algo-
rithm has received query q as a report, and let pq be the true probability of a user having
query q. We want to learn pq based on rC,q. By the design of our algorithm,
rC,q = t · pq +
∑
q′ 6=q
pq′(1− t) 1
k − 1
= t · pq + 1− t
k − 1
∑
q′ 6=q
pq′
= t · pq + 1− t
k − 1(1− pq).
Solving for pq in terms of rC,q yields pq =
rC,q− 1−tk−1
t− 1−t
k−1
. Using the obtained data for the
query rˆC,q, we estimate pC,q as pˆC,q =
rˆC,q− 1−tk−1
t− 1−t
k−1
.
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Denoising of record probability estimates: Analogously, denote by rC,〈q,u〉 the probability
that the algorithm has received a record 〈q, u〉 as a report, and recall p〈q,u〉 is the record’s true
probability in the data set. Then rC,〈q,u〉 = t ·tq ·p〈q,u〉+
(
t
1−tq
kq−1
)
(pq−p〈q,u〉)+
(
1−t
k−1
1
kq
)
(1−pq),
recalling from the algorithm that kq is the number of URLs associated with query q and
tq is the probability of truthfully reporting u given that query q was reported. Solving for
p〈q,u〉 yields p〈q,u〉 =
rC,〈q,u〉−
(
t
1−tq
kq−1pq+
(1−t)(1−pq)
(k−1)kq
)
t(tq− 1−tqkq−1 )
.
Using the obtained data for the empirical report estimate rˆC,〈q,u〉 together with the
query estimate pˆC,q, we estimate p〈q,u〉 as pˆC,〈q,u〉 =
rˆC,〈q,u〉−
(
t
1−tq
kq−1 pˆC,q+
(1−t)(1−pˆC,q)
(k−1)kq
)
t(tq− 1−tqkq−1 )
.
Theorem 4.5. If mO = 1 then the unbiased variance estimate for the opt-in group’s record
probabilities can be computed as: σˆ2O,〈q,u〉 =
|DT |
|DT |−1
(
pˆO,〈q,u〉(1−pˆO,〈q,u〉)
|DT | + 2
(
bT
|DT |
)2)
.
Proof. Given the head list, the distribution of EstimateOptinProbabilities’ estimate
for a record 〈q, u〉 is given by rO,〈q,u〉 = p〈q,u〉 + Y|DT | , where Y ∼ Laplace(bT ) with bT
being the scale parameter and recalling that |DT | is the total number of records from
the opt-in users used to estimate probabilities. The empirical estimator for rO,〈q,u〉 is
rˆO,〈q,u〉 = 1|DT |
∑|DT |
j=1 Xj +Y , where Xj ∼ Bernoulli(p〈q,u〉) is the random variable indicating
whether report j was record 〈q, u〉.
The expectation of this estimator is given by E[rˆO,〈q,u〉] = p〈q,u〉. Thus, rˆO,〈q,u〉 is an
unbiased estimator for p〈q,u〉. We denote pˆO,〈q,u〉 = rˆO,〈q,u〉 to explicitly reference it as the
estimator of p〈q,u〉. The variance for this estimator is
σ2O,〈q,u〉 = Var[pˆO,〈q,u〉] (8.4)
= Var
[ 1
|DT |
(|DT |∑
j=1
Xj + Y
)]
=
1
|DT |2
(
Var
[|DT |∑
j=1
Xj
]
+ Var [Y ]
)
(8.5)
=
1
|DT |2
(|DT |∑
j=1
Var [Xj ] + Var [Y ]
)
(8.6)
=
1
|DT |2
(|DT | · p〈q,u〉(1− p〈q,u〉))+ 2( bT|DT |
)2
=
p〈q,u〉(1− p〈q,u〉)
|DT | + 2
( bT
|DT |
)2
.
Equality 8.5 comes from the independence between Y and all Xj . Equality 8.6 relies on an
assumption of independence between Xj , Xk for all j 6= k (i.e., the iid assumption discussed
prior to the theorem statements).
To compute this variance, we need to use the data in place of the unknown p〈q,u〉. Using
pˆO,〈q,u〉 directly in place of p〈q,u〉 requires a
|DT |
|DT |−1 factor correction (known as “Bessel’s
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correction8”) to generate an unbiased estimate. Thus, the variance of each opt-in record
probability estimate is: σˆ2O,〈q,u〉 =
|DT |
|DT |−1
(
pˆO,〈q,u〉(1−pˆO,〈q,u〉)
|DT | + 2
(
bT
|DT |
)2)
.
Theorem 4.6. If mC = 1 then the unbiased variance estimate for the client group’s record
probabilities can be computed as:
σˆ2C,〈q,u〉 =
|DC |
t2
(
tq − 1−tqkq−1
)2
(|DC | − 1)
·
( rˆC,〈q,u〉(1− rˆC,〈q,u〉)
|DC | +
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)2
σˆ2C,q + 2
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
) rˆC,〈q,u〉(1− rˆC,q)
|DC |(t− 1−tk−1 )
)
.
Proof. We’ll first derive the variance estimate for the client group’s query probabilities, then
move on to the variance estimate for their record probabilities.
From the proof of Observation 4.4, the distribution of the reported query q from the
client mechanism is given by rC,q = t · pq + 1−tk−1(1− pq), and so the true probability of query
q is distributed as pq =
rC,q− 1−tk−1
t− 1−t
k−1
. The empirical estimator for pq is pˆC,q =
rˆC,q− 1−tk−1
t− 1−t
k−1
, where
rˆC,q is the empirical estimator of rC,q defined explicitly as rˆC,q =
1
|DC |
∑|DC |
j=1 Xj , where
Xj ∼ Bernoulli(rC,q) is the random variable indicating whether report j was query q and
recalling that |DC | is the total number of records from the client users.
The variance of rˆC,q is
Var[rˆC,q] = Var
[ 1
|DC |
|DC |∑
j=1
Xj
]
=
( 1
|DC |
)2 |DC |∑
j=1
Var [Xj ] (8.7)
=
( 1
|DC |
)2(|DC | · rC,q(1− rC,q)) (8.8)
=
rC,q(1− rC,q)
|DC | ,
where equality 8.7 relies on an assumption of independence between Xj , Xk for all j 6= k
(i.e., the iid assumption discussed prior to the theorem statements).
Then, the variance of pˆC,q, then, is
σ2C,q = Var[pˆC,q] = Var
[ rˆC,q − 1−tk−1
t− 1−t
k−1
]
=
rC,q(1− rC,q)
|DC |
(
t− 1−t
k−1
)2 .
To compute this variance, we need to use the data in place of the unknown rC,q. Using
rˆC,q directly in place of rC,q requires including Bessel’s
|DC |
|DC |−1 factor correction to yield
an unbiased estimate. Thus, the variance of the query probability estimates by the client
algorithm is: σˆ2C,q =
(
1
t− 1−t
k−1
)2
rˆC,q(1−rˆC,q)
|DC |−1 .
Now, we’ll derive the variance estimate for the record probabilities. For a given query q
and corresponding URL u in head list, denote Xqi as the indicator random variable that is
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bessel’s_correction
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1 if user i reported query q and 0 otherwise, and similarly denote X
〈q,u〉
i as the indicator
random variable that is 1 if user i reported query q and URL u and 0 otherwise. Note
that Xqi ∼ Bern(rq) and X〈q,u〉i ∼ Bern(r〈q,u〉). The covariance between these two random
variables is given by
Cov[Xqi , X
〈q,u〉
i ] = E[X
q
iX
〈q,u〉
i ]− E[Xqi ]E[X〈q,u〉i ] = rC,〈q,u〉 − rC,〈q,u〉rC,q = rC,〈q,u〉(1− rq).
Also note that due to the iid assumption, for any other user j, we have Cov(Xqi , X
〈q,u〉
j ) = 0.
Thus, we have the covariance between our empirical query and record estimates as
Cov[rˆq, rˆ〈q,u〉] = Cov
 1
|DC |
∑
i∈DC
Xqi ,
1
|DC |
∑
i∈DC
X
〈q,u〉
i

=
1
|DC |2 Cov
 ∑
i∈DC
Xqi ,
∑
i∈DC
X
〈q,u〉
i

=
1
|DC |2
∑
i,j∈DC
Cov[Xqi , X
〈q,u〉
j ]
=
1
|DC |2
∑
i∈DC
Cov[Xqi , X
〈q,u〉
i ]
=
rC,〈q,u〉(1− rC,q)
|DC | .
Utilizing this covariance expression, we can now compute the desired variance estimate
as:
σ2C,〈q,u〉 = Var[pˆC,〈q,u〉]
= Var
 rˆC,〈q,u〉 − (t 1−tqkq−1 pˆC,q + (1−t)(1−pˆC,q)(k−1)kq )
t(tq − 1−tqkq−1 )

=
1
t2(tq − 1−tqkq−1 )2
Var
[
rˆC,〈q,u〉 −
(
t
1− tq
kq − 1 pˆC,q +
(1− t)(1− pˆC,q)
(k − 1)kq
)]
=
1
t2(tq − 1−tqkq−1 )2
Var
[
rˆC,〈q,u〉 − pˆC,q
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)]
=
1
t2(tq − 1−tqkq−1 )2
·
(
Var
[
rˆC,〈q,u〉
]
+
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)2
Var [pˆC,q] + 2
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)
Cov[pˆC,q, rˆC,〈q,u〉]
)
=
1
t2(tq − 1−tqkq−1 )2
·
(
rC,〈q,u〉(1− rC,〈q,u〉)
|DC | +
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)2
σ2C,q + 2
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
) 1
t− 1−t
k−1
Cov[rˆC,q, rˆC,〈q,u〉]
)
=
1
t2(tq − 1−tqkq−1 )2
·
(
rC,〈q,u〉(1− rC,〈q,u〉)
|DC | +
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
)2
σ2C,q + 2
( 1− t
(k − 1)kq − t
1− tq
kq − 1
) 1
t− 1−t
k−1
rC,〈q,u〉(1− rC,q)
|DC |
)
.
Using our already-computed estimates rˆC,q, rˆC,〈q,u〉, and σˆ2C,〈q,u〉 (in place of rC,q, rC,〈q,u〉,
and σ2C,〈q,u〉 respectively) and applying Bessel’s correction, we obtain the stated result.
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Theorem 4.7. If σˆ2O,〈q,u〉 and σˆ
2
C,〈q,u〉 are sample variances of pˆO,〈q,u〉 and pˆC,〈q,u〉 respectively,
and the blended estimate is the convex combination pˆ〈q,u〉 = w〈q,u〉·pˆO,〈q,u〉+(1−w〈q,u〉)·pˆC,〈q,u〉,
then the sample variance optimal weighting is given by w〈q,u〉 =
σˆ2
C,〈q,u〉
σˆ2
O,〈q,u〉+σˆ
2
C,〈q,u〉
.
Proof. With the record probability and variance estimates for each group fully computed,
the blended estimate of p〈q,u〉 is given by pˆ〈q,u〉 = w〈q,u〉 · pˆO,〈q,u〉 + (1− w〈q,u〉) · pˆC,〈q,u〉. The
sample variance of pˆ〈q,u〉 is given by σˆ2〈q,u〉 = w
2
〈q,u〉 · σˆ2O,〈q,u〉+(1−w〈q,u〉)2 · σˆ2C,〈q,u〉. Minimizing
σˆ2〈q,u〉 with respect to w〈q,u〉 yields the stated result.
